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Pierre Jacob's book, What Minds Can Do, is mainly concerned with intentionality. 
Jacob's primary goal is to explain both how it is possible for a physical system to have 
intentional mental states and how the intentional content of such mental states can play 
a role in the causal explanation of behaviour. Yet, he also tackles the issue of the nature 
of conscious experience. I shall focus here on a claim he makes in connection with this 
latter topic. The claim (made at the very end of Chapter 2, p. 77) is that in order to 
undergo states of consciousness a creature must have concept-forming abilities. At first 
sight, this contention seems implausibly strong. Although our intuitions in such matters 
may not be very reliable, I think many people would be willing to attribute to members 
of certain animal species a capacity to enjoy conscious experiences, while being 
reluctant to grant them concept forming abilities. The plausibility or implausibility of 
Jacob's claim depends in a large part on how one construes the notion of a conscious 
experience, as well as on what one considers concept-forming abilities to be. Since the 
topic of consciousness is rather peripheral in Jacob's book, the rejection of this claim 
would not directly affect his more central theses. Yet, examining it gives us an 
opportunity to scrutinize a distinction that plays a central role in Dretske's work and that 
Jacob endorses, namely, the distinction between analogical and digital coding of 
information. Since this distinction underlies in turn the distinction between sensory 
content and conceptual content and since the latter distinction is at the core of 
informational semantics, this discussion may have at least indirect implications for some 
other problems discussed by Jacob in his book.  
 
Let me first recall the context in which the topic of consciousness arises in Jacob's 
book. Jacob advocates strong Representationalism, construed as the claim that the mind 
is primarily a representational system, or, to put it even more strongly as Dretske does, 
the claim that all mental facts are  representational facts. However, two rather different 
types of states populate the human mind: propositional attitudes such as beliefs and 
desires, and qualitative states, conscious experiences, sensations or qualia, that have a 
subjective character and a characteristic qualitative feel. Although the representationalist 
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claim seems tailor-made for propositional attitudes, it is far from obvious that it is true 
of qualitative states. 
The challenge then is to show that a theory of the semantic properties of 
propositional attitudes can throw light on conscious experiences as well. In order to get 
clearer as to where the problem lies, Jacob avails himself of two distinctions. The first 
distinction is between what Rosenthal (1986) calls 'creature consciousness' and 'state 
consciousness'. This distinction reflects the distinction between two uses, transitive and 
intransitive, that we make of the word conscious. The first, transitive, use corresponds 
to the application we make of the word conscious when we say of a being that it is 
conscious of something. It corresponds to what Rosenthal calls creature consciousness. 
This sense is to be distinguished from the use one makes of the word when one says of a 
state or process that it is conscious. This second use corresponds to what Rosenthal calls 
state consciousness and it is intransitive in the sense that saying of a state that it is 
conscious is not saying that the state is conscious of something. According to the 
higher-order thought theory of consciousness that Rosenthal advocates, the notion of 
state consciousness should be analysed in terms of the notion of creature consciousness. 
When we attribute consciousness to a state, an experience or a process, we are not, by 
the same token, attributing this state, experience or process an intrinsic property. The 
difference between a conscious and an unconscious experience (or state, or process) is 
not a difference in the experience, it is a difference in the experiencer (the owner of the 
state or process). A conscious state is a state a person whose state it is is conscious of in 
virtue of having formed a higher-order thought about it. The second distinction 
introduced by Jacob is Block's distinction between A-consciousness or access-
consciousness and P-consciousness or phenomenal consciousness. A person's mental 
states are A-conscious if they are available to the person for use in reasoning and 
rationally guiding thought and action. A state is P-conscious if it has a phenomenal or 
sensory properties, if there is something it is like to be in that state.  
According to Jacob, the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness 
accounts nicely for the accessibility notion of state-consciousness: one of my beliefs is a 
conscious belief if I am conscious of it. Yet Jacob denies that the HOT theory also 
accounts for P-consciousness. He deems it implausible to require that only creatures 
able to from higher-order thoughts about lower-order sensory states can have states such 
that there is something  it is like to be in those states. A sensory state, he claims, can be 
conscious in the sense of P-consciousness, without the person whose state it is having to 
form a higher-order thought about it. Those states are what Jacob calls states of 
consciousness: "Sensory states via which a person is creature-conscious of things and 
properties which are not conscious states in the higher-order sense I propose to call 
states of consciousness." (p. 62, n. 18)  
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Given these distinctions, the task of accounting for problems of consciousness in 
representationalist terms divides into two sub-tasks. First sub-task: use the HOT theory 
to throw light on the accessibility sense of consciousness; in other words, account for A-
consciousness in terms of metarepresentational abilities. Second sub-task: use 
informational semantics to account for consciousness in the phenomenal sense; in other 
words, account for P-consciousness in terms of concept-forming abilities. I'll be 
concerned here with the second sub-task.  
According to Jacob, together with many other philosophers (including myself), 
sensory states, which are the paradigmatic cases of P-conscious states, are states with 
non-conceptual content, whereas belief states are states with conceptual content. Thus, 
claiming that the having of P-conscious states requires concept-forming abilities 
amounts to claiming that it requires belief-forming abilities. Following Dretske, Jacob 
relies upon the distinction between analogical and digital encoding in order to account 
for the distinction between the non-conceptual content of experience and the conceptual 
content of a belief.  
The difference between an analog and a digital encoding of information is 
traditionally thought of as a difference between a continuous and a discrete 
representation of some variable property. Dretske, however, makes a slightly 
unorthodox use of the distinction by using it not to distinguish between the various ways 
in which information about properties might be encoded, but to mark the different ways 
in which facts can be represented. Thus, according to Dretske’s use of the terms, a 
signal (structure, event, or state) will be said to carry the information that s is F in 
digital form if and only if the signal carries no additional information about s, no 
information that is not already nested in s’s being F. If the signal does carry additional 
information about s, information that is not already nested in s’s being F, the signal will 
be said to carry this information in analog form. Information that t is G is said to be 
nested in s’s being F if and only if s’s being F carries the information that t is G. It 
should also be noted that every signal carries information in both analog and digital 
form. The most specific piece of information the signal carries (about s) is the only 
piece of information it carries (about s) in digital form; all other information (about s) is 
coded in analog form.  
The contrast between analog and digital encoding of information is used by 
Dretske for distinguishing between sensory and cognitive processes. Dretske contends 
that the difference between our perceptual experience, the experience that constitutes 
our seeing and hearing things and the perceptual knowledge (or belief) that is normally 
consequent upon that experience is, fundamentally, a coding difference. Sensory 
perception is the process by means of which information is delivered within a richer 
matrix of information (hence in analog from) to the cognitive centers for their selective 
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use. Cognitive activity, on the other hand, is the conceptual mobilization of incoming 
information, and this conceptual treatment is fundamentally a matter of ignoring 
differences, of abstracting, classifying, generalizing, hence a matter of analog to digital 
conversion. In this respect the relation between sensory processes and cognitive 
processes is like the relation of a preliminary analog representation to a subsequent 
digital representation.  
In Knowledge and the flow of information (1981), Dretske distinguishes between 
the informational content of a state and its semantic content, where the informational 
content of a state is all the information it carries and its semantic content the 
information it carries in digital form. One might be tempted to equate the non-
conceptual content of a sensory state with the content it encodes in analogical form, 
hence its informational content. And Jacob seems ready to endorse this move, when he 
says (p. 75): "If the sensory content of a sensory experience is non-conceptual content 
and non-conceptual content is information analogically coded, then there will be no 
room for a notion of a maximally specific sensory experience." and then adds: "I think 
an informational semanticist can embrace this conclusion and live with it". As for me, I 
think this move should be resisted if we want to preserve the idea that sensory states are 
representational states, states with correctness conditions as Peacocke (1992) would say. 
Informational states cannot be equated with sensory representational states, since it is an 
essential  feature of representational states that they may be false or incorrect.  
The problem of accounting for this feature of representations is what is ordinarily 
called the problem of misrepresentations. According to Jacob, we should in fact 
distinguish two problems, the problem of imperfect correlations, which is a disjunction 
problem, and the problem of transitivity which is a problem of indeterminacy. Jacob 
further contends that the first problem has an informational solution, whereas the latter 
requires a teleological solution. In his last two books (1988, 1995) Dretske advocates a 
mixed approach to representations: an informationally-based teleological approach. The 
distinction between the informational and the semantic contents of a state is replaced by 
the distinction between what a states indicates and what it is its function to indicate. For 
states to be sensory representations and not just informational states, it is necessary that 
they have a function of indicating. This point is acknowledged by Dretske in 
Naturalizing the Mind (1995), where he draws the distinction between sensory 
representations and conceptual representations, not in terms of analogical versus digital 
encoding of information, but in terms of a distinction between systemic and acquired 
indicator functions. Dretske proposes that we identify perceptual states as states whose 
representational properties are systemic where a state is said to have a systemic indicator 
function in case it derives its function from the system of which it is a state. Such 
indicator functions are conceived as phylogenetically determined and hence fixed. By 
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contrast, thoughts and conceptual representations in general are identified with states 
whose representational properties are acquired, where a state is said to have an acquired 
indicator function, if it derives its indicator function not from the system of which it is a 
state, but from the type of state of which it is a token. Those indicator functions are 
ontologically determined, not phylogenetically determined, and, through learning, they 
can change.  
If we adopt this view, we cannot say that what distinguishes non-conceptual 
content from conceptual content is that non-conceptual content is information 
analogically coded, at least in the sense of analogical used by Dretske. The content of 
both sensory and conceptual states is the information it is their function to carry. There 
is no reason to say that this information is carried in analogical form in the case of 
sensory states and in digital form in the case of conceptual states. If we want to keep 
talking of analogical vs. digital encoding of information, we should rather say that in 
both cases the representational content of the states is encoded in digital form, the 
information nested in the information that is represented may then be said to be 
analogically coded. But then both conceptual and non-conceptual representations may 
be said to encode information both in digital and in analogical ways. The thought 'a is 
square' encodes digitally hence represents the fact that a is square, it also encodes 
analogically but does not represent the fact that a is rectangular. If we borrow 
Peacocke's notion of a scenario content, we may say that my present visual experience 
encodes digitally hence represents the way in which the space around me is filled out. If 
the object a that is square happens to be in front of me, we may say that my sensory 
representation also encodes analogically the fact that a is square, but it is not a sensory  
representation of the fact that a is square.  
From this picture, it follows that the distinction between sensory representations 
and conceptual representations cannot be based on the distinction between analogical 
and digital encoding of information in Dretske's sense. What is true is that sensory 
representations have a richer and much more specific representational content than 
conceptual representations and that, as a consequence, they also encode analogically 
more information than conceptual representations, since the richer the representational 
content of a state, the greater the amount of information nested in it. But the 
representational content of sensory states is not information analogically coded.  
Jacob's requirement that a system should not be granted states of consciousness 
unless it have concept-forming abilities stems, I think, from two worries. The first worry 
is that unless we impose such a requirement, we would have no reason not to grant 
conscious experiences to physical systems capable of receiving and encoding 
information analogically without being able to digitalize it. I think it is easy to alleviate 
this worry once we make a distinction between information-carrying states that carry 
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information analogically and sensory states. What makes a state a sensory state, a state 
with non-conceptual content, is not the fact that it carries information encoded 
analogically, it is the fact that it has a certain systemic indicator function. As a result, 
sensory states have representational content and not just informational content. The 
difference between sensory states and physical systems such as thermostats is that 
sensory states have natural indicator functions, whereas thermostats don't. When a 
physical device such as a thermostat has an indicator function, it owes it to the 
intentions or purposes of external designers. Its indicator function is conventional, not 
natural. If this worry was the only one, it would be enough, in order to alleviate it, to 
replace Jacob's requirement with the weaker requirement that to undergo states of 
consciousness, a creature must have states with natural indicator functions.  
However, there is a second worry, well expressed by Evans (1982), and echoed by 
Jacob. The idea is that not until some information can "serve as the input to a thinking, 
concept-applying, and reasoning system", can a person be said to undergo an experience 
as opposed to some part of his or her brain receiving and processing the information. In 
other words, we still need to distinguish between a representational state that is merely 
present in an organism and a representational state that is present for the organism. If we 
consider, for instance, Marr’s theory of vision (Marr, 1982), we would not want to say 
that the primal sketch is a state of consciousness, not because it is not a representational 
state, but because the information contained in this state is not available to the system as 
a whole for further elaboration and use in the control and regulation of behavior. The 
problem here is that of availability to the system as a whole. So when Jacob requires 
that "a sensory state — a state encoding information analogically — must serve as a 
possible input to a concept-forming ability for it to count as a conscious experience" (p. 
77), I gather that what he wants to insure is that the sensory state be present for the 
organism and not just in the organism. Two assumptions, I think, underlie this 
requirement. The first is that only digitalized information can be exploited by organisms 
in order to control and regulate their behavior. The second is that sensory states encode 
information analogically and not digitally. As I argued earlier, the second assumption 
should be rejected. Sensory states have non-conceptual semantic properties, they are not 
just information carriers. As a consequence, there is no reason to deny that sensory 
representations may in certain cases be used telles quelles in the steering of behavior. If 
an organism's sensory representations are well adapted to his needs, there is no reason to 
require that they always be recalibrated or further digitalized before being put to use by 
the organism. 
The requirement that sensory representations serve as possible inputs to a concept-
forming capacity presumably ensures that they are present for the organism and not just 
to the organism. Thus, this requirement may be taken as a sufficient condition for 
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availability to the system as a whole, but I doubt that it is a necessary condition. There 
may be other means to insure this availability. The architecture of a system may provide 
for an interface between sensory states, motivations, and behaviour, without concepts 
being needed to act as go-betweens. Therefore, I think we should relax Jacob's 
requirement and say instead that to undergo states of consciousness, a creature must 
have states with natural indicator functions and the information supplied by those states 
must be available to the creature for use in the control and regulation of behavior.  
I think this weaker requirement meshes rather well with some of the views Jacob 
says defends later in the book. In chapter 8 (p. 261), in particular, Jacob advocates a 
threefold distinction between instinctive non-intentional behavior, intentional non-
voluntary behavior and intentional voluntary behavior, where instinctive non-intentional 
behavior is not produced by representations, intentional non-voluntary is produced by 
innate, including sensory, representations, and intentional voluntary behavior is 
produced by beliefs. I see no reason why we should deny states of consciousness to 
creatures capable of intentional non-voluntary behavior (but not intentional voluntary 
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